Abstract. Quantum key distribution (QKD), ensuring unconditional security of information, attracts a great deal of interest. One of the most actual tasks is to design modular QKD setups as a platform for educational purposes as well as for research and development applications. In this work, we present a modular QKD system driven by National Instruments (NI) cards with open source LabView code and open source Python code for post processing. We demonstrate that the developed modular QKD setup has a high degree of robustness beyond laboratory conditions. We use the setup for distribution of quantum keys between two bank offices in Moscow.
Introduction
In the view of possible appearance of large-scale quantum computers in the next decades, the only way to ensure long-term information security is to use tools providing unconditional security such as the one-time pad scheme [1] [2] [3] . The crucial problem towards to practical implementations of unconditional security mechanisms is solving the key distribution problem [3] .
An elegant and practical technique allowing to overcome this challenge is using QKD [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . QKD provides an elegant way for generation of private random keys between legitimate remote users (Alice and Bob). It should be noted that in the classical world the mechanism preventing an eavesdropper (Eve) copying keys during their transmission is absent. The crucial feature of QKD is the use of quantum objects as information carriers [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . Due to the quantum non-cloning theorem [9] , eavesdropper (Eve) is unable to keep a copy of sent quantum signals. Futhermore, any measurement leads to a distortion of transmitted quantum states. Thus, QKD is a method, which offers information-theoretic security based on the laws of physics. Remarkably, QKD is one of the first quantum technologies operating with individual quantum objects available on the market [10] . Nevertheless, another important demand is to design modular QKD setups offering possibilities for research and development. It is meaningful for testing novel QKD protocols and proof-of-concept demonstration of possible attacks. This problem is of significant importance for the education of a new generation of engineers and researchers as well.
In the present work, we demonstrate a modular QKD setup. It realizes the plug&play optical scheme [11] with the use of the seminal BB84 QKD protocol [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . The designed setup is driven by NI cards with open source LabView code and open source Python code for the post processing. Platforms based on NI is commonly used in research activity of the academic community. The system can operate with any type of free running single-photon detectors. We use ID230 detectors [12] . The external drivers of single-photon detectors, phase modulators and synchronization detector are realized as removable modules. Each device can drive up to 4 detectors and 6 universal ports for phase or amplitude modulators. Although the fact that the setup is oriented research and development applications, it demonstrates high degree of robustness beyond laboratory conditions. We use the designed setup for generation of quantum keys over a distance of 30 km between two bank offices in Moscow with the final key generation rate on the level of 0.5 kbit/s.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we describe the developed modular QKD setup. In Sec. 3, we demonstrate experimental results on generation of random private key generation between two bank offices with the use of the developed setup. We briefly describe post-processing procedure in Sec. 4. In Sec. 5, we conclude and summarize our results.
Modular QKD setup
The developed modular QKD setup consists of two essential parts, Alice and Bob. Here, Alice is in charge of the quantum signals' preparation, whereas Bob measures the results. Fig. 1 shows a design concept of the Alice's unit (Bob's unit looks similarly). On the right side of the unit, one can see a row of 8 red add-on electronic cards with SubMiniature version A (SMA) connectors. The laser module, phase and amplitude modulator drivers are implemented in the form of such cards. These cards can be inserted into the motherboard, which is situated at the bottom of the unit. The main function of the motherboard is to provide commutation between add-on cards and the NI board, installed in a PC and connected to the motherboard via a PCI cable. In addition, the motherboard implements the power supply control and executes a delaying of electric pulses to apply them at the correct time to optic modulators.
On the top side of the Bob or Alice unit there is an optic table, where fiber optic components can be settled. Thus, the developed modular QKD setup is easily reachable from all sides. So one can reconfigure both the optical scheme and electronic driver cards set. A sufficient amount of additional SMA connectors allows one to connect an oscilloscope to investigate the shape of electrical pulses and their position on the timescale. The units are supplied with removable covers and side handles for transportation.
Using such a modular setup, we assemble and test a simplified version of the plug&play QKD scheme in various regimes (see Fig. 2a ). The plug&play scheme has a simple configuration and parameters adjustments. So it is a perfect starting point for experimental studies in QKD. The plug&play scheme consists of a two-pass auto-compensation fiber optic scheme with MachZehnder interferometric phase shift measurements. A description of the plug&play scheme is given in detail in Refs. [11, 13, 14] .
The details of the developed modular QKD setup are as follows. The semiconductor laser LDI-DFB2.5G under the control of FPGA board Spartan-6 generates optical pulses 2 ns wide on the standard telecommunication wavelength 1.55 µm with a frequency of 10 MHz. The circulator, beamsplitters, Faraday mirror and phase modulators are standard components. The quantum channel and storage line are single mode fibers. In particular, the quantum channel is single mode fiber of 25.5 km length with 4.8 dB total losses. The single-photon detectors are ID230 by ID Quantique [12] . Using a short as possible time window allows us to reduce the quantum bit error rate (QBER). Overall control of the electro-optic components is realized by NI PCIe-7811R installed in the corresponding PC (Bob or Alice). The QKD procedure includes repetitive sessions of 10 3 trains with 2.4 × 10 3 pulses in each train.
The raw key is being sifted after each session via the public channel by the TCP/IP protocol. Fig. 2b shows the QBER level as the function of distributed key size. The results are obtained as a result of a five-day continuous operation in the laboratory, including unsupervised operation on weekends. The output is a truly random 70.2 MB keys with the average value of QBER is on the level 2.6%. Fig. 2b is shown with QBER averaging for every 2 KB of the key.
Here, we also present the result of testing the version of the developed modular QKD setup with improved stability out of laboratory conditions. After the stability improvement (both in hardware and software), the system demonstrates much less noisy operation. The corresponding QBER as the function of distributed key size is shown in Fig. 2c, Fig. 2d, and Fig. 2e . During the 18 hours of intermittent work, 4 MB key was distributed with 1.6% average QBER. The abrupt steps of QBER are connected to changes of Alice's optic signal attenuation. The value of the standard deviation σ(QBER) = 0.25 in the stability regions is significantly lower for the system before stability improvement (σ(QBER) = 0.59, see Fig. 2b ).
Key distribution between two bank offices in Moscow
With the fully functional plug&play scheme based on our modular system, we test the modular QKD setup between two bank offices. The quantum channel fiber length is 30.6 km, and the total attenuation is equal to 11.7 dB. The results of the test are as follows. The source intensity level is about 0.18 photons, key generation rate is close to 1.0 kbit/s at the average value of QBER is equal to 5.7%. With an intensity of 0.35 photons exiting the sender, the corresponding parameters are equal to 1.9 kbit/s at the average value of QBER is equal 5.1%. Thus, the highest achievable key generation rates are on the level of 1.1 and 2.2 kbit/s, correspondingly. These keys are the input for the post-processing procedure described below.
Post-processing procedure
Technical imperfections and possible eavesdropping lead to discrepancies in sifted quantum keys. The typical level of such errors in QKD experiments is on the level of few percent, which is too high for practical applications. That is why the post-processing of sifted keys is an inherent part of both industrial and R&D oriented QKD systems. The post-processing procedure consists of error correction, parameter estimation, and privacy amplification. The designed modular QKD setup uses proof-of-principle realizations of the procedure developed in Refs. [15] [16] [17] [18] . Proof-ofprinciple realizations of the basic stages of the post-processing procedure are available [17, 18] .
The post-processing procedure works as follows. Sifted keys go through the information reconciliation stage that is adjusted by the current value of QBER. This stage uses the following error correction algorithm with two basic steps. The first step is to use the LDPC syndrome coding/decoding [19, 20] to correct discrepancies between keys. This procedure is described in details in Ref. [16] . The universal polynomial hashing [21] aimed at verification of an identity between keys after previous step is used as the second step [17] . As a result of this stage of the post-processing procedure, Alice and Bob have identical private quantum keys. Figure 2 . Developed modular QKD setup. In (a) the used plug&play scheme is demonstrated: D0 and D1 are single-photon detectors, PBS is the polarization beamsplitter, PM is the phase modulator, VOA is the variable optical attenuator, FM is the Faraday mirror, QC is the quantum channel, SL is the storage line, DL is the delay line, SD is the synchro detector, C is the circulator, and PC is the personal computer. In (b) the QBER level as the function of distributed key size is shown (σ(QBER) = 0.59), where σ is the standard deviation. In (c) the QBER level as the function of distributed key size after improvements in stability is shown (σ(QBER) = 0.55). We note that here sharp change of the QBER level as the function of distributed key size correspond to a change of the regime of the key generation. In (d) and (e) the QBER level as the function of distributed key size is shown for particular stability regions. For these stability regions, the average value of the standard deviation is σ(QBER) = 0.25, which is significantly lower for the system before stability improvement.
After the accumulation of a necessary number of blocks the input goes to the parameter estimation (together with their versions before the error correction). If an estimated value of QBER is higher than the critical value needed for efficient privacy amplification, the parties receive warning message about possible eavesdropping. In other cases, verified blocks input privacy amplification stage (see below), and estimated QBER is used in next round of the information reconciliation stage.
The algorithm of privacy amplification checks first (according to Ref. [21] ) whether it is possible to distill private key with the given length and security parameter [21, 23] . If the answer to the question about the possibility of key generation with the desired parameters is positive, then the final private key is computed as a hash function of the input bit string. The family of hash functions is required to be 2-universal [21] . The generalization to almost universal families of hash functions is also possible.
Discussions and conclusions
We have presented the modular QKD setup for research applications. The software solution in charge of controlling the system is written in the development environment LabVIEW created by NI. It is a popular tool used by scientists and others, mostly for data acquisition, instrument control and industrial automation. We consider LabVIEW as an optimal choice for educational purposes as well as for research and development applications. This environment is widely used in universities workshops on physics. A significant advantage of the environment is the graphical programming language.
Due to the quantum basis and optical methods of information transfer, the developed modular QKD setup is suited pretty well for the education of undergraduate physics students. Taking into account challenging tasks to generate, control, modify and synchronize electric and optical pulses, it is a powerful practical course for electronics engineers and hardware programmers. Involving the necessity to correct errors in sifted quantum keys and privacy amplification, we get a wide field for research for algorithm developers and mathematicians.
Despite the fact that the setup has been designed for research and development applications, it demonstrates a high degree of robustness beyond laboratory conditions. We have presented the results of using the setup for generation of quantum keys between two bank offices in Moscow.
